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Abstract 
Global warming is expected to make the climate warmer, wetter, and wilder. It is predicted that such 
climate change will increase the severity and frequency of climate-related disasters like flash floods, 
surges, cyclones and severe storms. This article uses econometric methods to study the consequences 
of climate-induced natural disasters on economic growth, and how these disasters are linked to the 
onset of armed civil conflict either directly or via their impact on economic growth. The results show 
that climate-related natural disasters have a negative effect on growth and that the impact is 
considerable. The analysis of conflict onset shows that climate-related natural disasters do not increase 
the risk of armed conflict. This is also true when we instrument the change in GDP growth by climatic 
disasters. The result is robust to inclusion of country and time fixed effects, different estimation 
techniques, various operationalization of the disasters measure as well as for conflict incidence and 
war onset. These findings have two major implications: if climate change increases the frequency or 
make weather-related natural disasters more severe, it is an economic concern for countries susceptible 
to these types of hazards. However, our results suggest—based on historical data—that more frequent 
and severe climate-related disasters will not lead to more armed conflicts through their effects on GDP 
growth.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Catastrophes such as typhoons and floods have caused significant economic and human losses 
throughout the history. The heavy monsoon that hit Pakistan in July 2010 caused floods that 
ravaged the country, bringing enormous damage to homes, schools, fields, and infrastructure. 
The reported death toll for the event is about 2,000, while an estimated 20.3 million people, or 
more than 10% of the Pakistani population, were affected (OFDA, 2010). 
We might be able to grasp the gravity of disaster damages through testimonies from 
victims, relief workers, and journalists, but the short- and long-term effects on economic 
growth and peace remain largely unknown. What happens to production and national income 
in the short run? Furthermore, with regard to ongoing transnational efforts to prevent armed 
civil conflicts, what are the effects of climate-related events? 
The potential impact of climate change in the form of natural disasters is relevant not only 
for Pakistan: on average more than 270 devastating floods and storms are reported every year 
throughout the world (CRED, 2011).1
Questions about the impacts of such disasters are clearly of great importance for the 
livelihoods of a large number of people and countries and hence for international 
development agencies and policymakers throughout the global community. As global 
warming is expected to lead to an increase in both the severity and the frequency of climate-
related disasters (IPCC, 2007: 43–54), it is important to understand how climate change will 
affect economies, and whether these will translate into more armed conflicts, directly or via 
impacts on economic growth. However, only a few studies have attempted to quantify the 
impact of these events using econometric methods and large N-scale panel datasets. In this 
article, we examine how climate-related natural disasters, including flash floods, surges, 
cyclones, blizzards, and severe storms, affect economic growth and peace. We label these 
events climatic disasters throughout the analysis. 
 Although it is the large-scale events that make the 
headlines, the frequency of smaller events is equally striking: Even in absence of large-scale 
events in 2009, more than 100 million people were victims of climatic disasters (Vos et al., 
2010). 
                                                 
1 In fact, these two disaster classes alone represent more than 70% of all disasters reported in CRED’s EM-DAT 
database the latest decade.  See www.emdat.be. 
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By using ordinary least squares (OLS) and panel data on climate-related disasters and 
short-run economic growth,2
Our study differs from previous work on natural disasters, economic growth, and conflict 
onset in several important ways. First, much of the previous work considers the economic 
effects of large-scale disasters. By contrast, this study includes small disasters in the analysis, 
and thereby takes into consideration that the large majority of what we define as natural 
disasters are actually small-scale events. Second, we use fixed effects methods to control for 
unobserved factors that may affect the results. For example, climate and closeness to coastline 
may affect both the occurrence of natural disasters and economic growth, or there may be 
overreporting on disaster magnitude in less developed countries to attract international aid. 
Finally, while most previous disaster studies ignore the possibility that different disaster types 
have different effects on the economy (for instance by aggregating geophysical events such as 
volcano eruptions and earthquakes, biological events such as famines, and slow onset events 
such as droughts, and then treat them as one), we only look at climatic disasters that come as 
sudden shocks and last for no longer than one month. 
 we confirm that climate-related disasters have a negative impact 
on growth. However, our analysis of disaster data and conflict onset shows that climate-
related natural disasters do not have any direct effect on conflict onset. We then instrument 
economic growth using our disaster measure in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis to 
study whether climate-related disasters have an indirect effect on conflict onset via slowdown 
in economic growth. By doing this, we also address the simultaneity problem between income 
and conflict: as well as slow and negative economic growth may cause conflict, an 
approaching conflict may lead to slow growth, for example, when extractive industries 
withdraw from unstable countries that are on the brink of sliding into conflict. Instrumenting 
growth using climatic disasters allows us to impose exogenous growth variation in growth. 
However, we do not find any evidence that economic shocks caused by climate-related 
disasters have an effect on conflict onset. This result differs from the negative causal link 
between economic growth and conflict found in other studies, including Collier & Hoeffler 
(2004) and Miguel et al. (2004). However, our findings are similar to those in the recent 
cross-country study by Ciccone (2011).  
The article proceeds as follows. We begin by discussing the effect of climatic disasters on 
economic performance, drawing on recent literature, and how previous studies have 
considered natural phenomena in armed civil conflict research. Then we present our main 
                                                 
2 We define the short run as the current year and next year. 
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hypotheses. Before turning to the analysis, we present our data and how our disaster variables 
have been constructed. We conclude by discussing the main results and their implications. 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF NATURAL DISASTERS 
As the devastating 2010 floods in Pakistan demonstrate, climate-related natural disasters 
undoubtedly cause very real economic damage when they occur: lives are lost, people are 
forced to leave their homes, buildings and other infrastructure collapse, and extractable 
resources become unavailable. All these consequences can be defined as direct impacts in the 
sense that they arise as immediate outcomes of disasters. Such impacts are obviously negative 
for most of the affected individuals and their economic activities. There are also a number of 
indirect impacts that follow in the aftermath of natural disasters and that are linked to 
economic activity such as income changes; demand and supply shocks; shifting terms of 
trade; and increased inflation. 
The net effect on overall economic performance is the sum of the direct and indirect 
impacts. Although many authors believe that natural disasters are likely to have a negative 
impact on economic growth (Noy, 2009), this is not so clear from a theoretical point of view, 
at least not in the medium and long term, and at the aggregate national level. People and 
companies repair the damage, governments set up large infrastructure projects to repair 
damages and to prepare better for future disasters, and there may be substantial inflows of 
emergency aid. All these actions generate economic activity that may exceed the direct 
damages caused by the disaster. Consequently, the short-run effects on economic growth that 
this article considers are really a matter of dynamics and the selected time frame, and hence 
an empirical question. In the face of global warming, it is imperative to study these effects.  
Surprisingly little research has been conducted to identify the relationship between climatic 
natural disasters and economic growth. Of these studies, Skidmore & Toya (2002) report a 
positive link between persistent climatic events such as droughts, extreme temperatures, 
wildfires, and economic growth while Loyza et al. (2009) find a positive effect on economic 
growth from floods and a negative effect from droughts. Raddatz (2007, 2009) reports that 
large-scale climatic disasters are negatively linked to economic growth. A negative effect on 
growth is also reported by Noy (2009) who assumes that geophysical, climatic, and biological 
disasters all have the same effect on growth and thus aggregates all these disasters together. 
As the results are partially ambiguous and the impacts of natural disasters may vary 
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depending on their nature, more research is required. In this article we study a set of weather-
related disasters which are likely to become more frequent in the future as they are related to 
climate change. 
CLIMATIC DISASTERS, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND CONFLICT 
Research indicates that economic growth is related to the occurrence of armed conflict. If 
sudden changes in economic growth increase the risk of armed conflict, and weather-related 
disasters cause negative growth shocks, a logical consequence would be that such disasters 
can cause armed conflict via their negative impact on growth. 
Several empirical studies document that slow economic growth and low income levels are 
important in predicting which countries will experience a conflict: armed civil conflict is 
more likely to occur in poor countries than in rich (see, among others, Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). This can be the result of frustration 
and grievances, ease of recruiting rebels when even modest compensations to the rebel and 
his/her family exceed their present income, and lack of military capabilities and state capacity 
to prevent and suppress armed conflicts. 
Of course, the political and social unrest that frequently precedes the onset of armed 
conflict often erodes economic institutions, causing economic havoc and making it more 
difficult to maintain peace. Herein lays a great econometric challenge: the latent start of a 
conflict may occur long before the unrest qualifies as a conflict onset in traditional conflict 
datasets such as the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict data. This implies a very real endogeneity 
problem because the low income growth may be as much a result of an approaching armed 
conflict as of a conflict itself. Many studies point to the importance of economic factors in 
explaining conflict onset, but only a few provide convincing solutions to this endogeneity 
problem. Most studies—such as those just mentioned—understandably rely on lagged 
regressors, and conclude that because low income level and negative income shocks tend to 
occur before the commencement of civil conflicts, they appear to be likely causes. 
Methods of overcoming the simultaneity problem include the use of instrumental variables, 
as in Miguel et al. (2004), in which the researchers use rainfall in sub-Saharan Africa as 
instrument for GDP per capita growth. They find that a one percentage point decrease in 
rainfall raises the likelihood of a country experiencing conflict incidence by about two 
percentage points and conflict onset by three percentage points. Given that rainfall causes 
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exogenous economic growth shocks, the 2SLS instrumental variable approach shows not only 
how growth correlates with conflict, but also justifies the causal assertion. 
Bernauer et al. (2012) use deviation in temperature and rainfall (from long run averages) as 
instruments for economic growth in a global dataset for the period 1980–2004. They find no 
significant link between climate variability, economic growth, and the risk of conflict onset. 
This conclusion remains robust for a sub-sample including only African countries, thus 
contrasting with the results of Miguel et al. (2004). The Miguel et al. study is further 
challenged by Ciccone (2011) who shows that a misspecification of rainfall measures may 
explain the observed negative relation between rainfall and conflict.3
Some studies focus solely on the reduced-form relation between climate and the risk of 
conflict. Burke et al. (2009) study panel data on African countries between 1981 and 2002 by 
means of fixed effects transformed models, and find that a one degree Celsius increase in 
temperature will increase the risk of armed civil conflict by as much as 4.5 percentage points 
within the same year. However, Buhaug (2010) compares different data and model 
specifications, and concludes that climate variability in terms of temperature is a poor 
predictor of armed civil conflict. 
   
A few studies consider the effects of climate-related disasters4 on conflict using disaster 
dummies and frequencies.5 Studies by Nel & Righarts (2008) and Besley & Persson (2011) 
find that climate disasters increase the risk of armed conflict. Slettebak (2012), however, finds 
that if anything, climate related disasters seem to reduce the risk of armed conflict onset.6
                                                 
3 The same Ciccone study shows that Miguel et al. results do not hold when the time series are extended from 
1999 to 2009. Brückner & Ciccone (2010) shows that the Miguel et al. study is not robust to using year fixed 
effects.   
 All 
three studies are vulnerable to unobserved country heterogeneity in the sense that the 
distribution of natural disasters across countries probably is non-random. Indeed, the use of 
fixed effects transformations in our study is motivated by this econometric challenge. 
4 Variation in temperature and rainfall may reflect climate-related disasters such as droughts and floods, but only 
indirectly and only when these are large and intense enough to affect the annual figures. These measures may 
also reflect other variations that are not related to climate shocks and thus fall outside the definition of natural 
disaster. 
5 By doing so the studies pay equal attention to events affecting 100 people as those affecting 100,000 people, 
for instance. 
6 In addition to these studies on climate-related disasters, Brancati (2007) and Nel & Righarts (2008) find that 
earthquakes increase the likelihood of incidence of armed conflict. 
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Although there is strong evidence that slow growth is linked to conflict onset, the other 
elements in the potential natural disaster to conflict pathway are less studied and understood. 
Clarifying the effects of natural disasters, particularly climate-related hazards, on the 
economy and on peace becomes important as we face global warming. Some previous studies 
indicate that natural disasters can have a negative impact on growth, but there is little research 
that examines whether these in turn trigger armed conflict. Given the causal pathway from 
natural disasters to slow growth and to armed civil conflict, the link between climate-related 
disasters and economic growth on the one hand, and economic fluctuations triggered by 
nature and armed civil conflict on the other hand, has not yet been investigated 
comprehensively. This article analyzes these relationships. 
HYPOTHESES 
To identify and quantify the short-run causal effects between climatic disasters, income 
growth, and armed civil conflict, our study proceeds in two stages. Because it is crucial to 
understand the effect of climate-related natural disasters on economic growth, we have chosen 
to analyze this relationship separately and in more detail than a mere instrumental variable 
analysis entails. Therefore, we first study the relationship between climate events and 
economic growth, and then the effect of growth on armed conflict onset. 
Natural disasters are likely to affect growth immediately through their impact on 
production inputs: when severe climate-related natural disasters come as sudden and 
unexpected shocks or events, they cause damage to humans and infrastructure. Floods, winds 
related to heavy precipitation, unusually strong monsoons, storms, and tropical cyclones, 
destroy crops, kill farm animals, and can postpone the planting or harvesting season, thus 
having severe effects on people’s income and assets. Damage to houses and farm buildings 
may force people to leave their homes and land, further limiting their income opportunities 
until they are able to return, rebuild, and plant, and the next harvesting season arrives. Even 
then, the land or equipment may be damaged to an extent that makes the first harvests 
unusually small. Disasters may also damage other infrastructure such as roads and factories 
and cause considerable harm to settlements in villages and cities, as demonstrated by the 
flooding that occurred in Pakistan in 2010. Even when there is substantial international relief 
assistance, these shocks alter input stocks that are used to create income and economic growth 
to the extent that in the short run we expect to see decline in economic growth. 
9 
 
 
H1: Climate-related disasters have a negative effect on economic growth 
The previous literature on conflict onset has shown that slow economic growth is negatively 
related to increased risk of conflict onset. We take this as our point of departure and expect 
that negative economic shocks caused by climate events will increase the risk of armed 
conflict onset. 
 
H2: Negative income growth shocks caused by climate-related disasters increase the 
likelihood of armed civil conflict onset 
Even though much of the identification strategy for our second hypothesis relies heavily on 
arguments similar to those in Miguel et al. (2004) and Bernauer et al. (2012), our approach 
differs in some important ways. In contrast to these studies on temperature- and rainfall-
induced conflict, we investigate disasters that come as sudden and more unexpected shocks. 
While most climatic disasters last for only some days, and so appear as impulses in the time 
dimension, for temperature and rainfall the variation in annual rainfall levels is a rather 
gradual phenomenon in most countries. Droughts in particular can go on for long periods of 
time and this time persistence may lead to expectations; for example, during a drought period 
a best prediction for near future is that the drought continues. In this way rainfall expectations 
among farmers and potential rebels may affect their willingness to join rebel movements. This 
in turn, may lead to endogeneity in models where rainfall is used as an instrument for 
economic growth.7
Furthermore, rainfall can have very heterogeneous effects on economic performance across 
countries. For instance, it is likely that agricultural economies in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
affected more heavily by rainfall variation than those in countries that use more advanced 
cultivation methods or have more diversified economies. Floods, cyclones, and storms, on the 
other hand, should have a negative impact whenever and wherever they occur. In this way, we 
 By contrast, it is much harder to forecast sudden climatic disasters as they 
tend to come more as discrete shocks than as continuous events making them less predictable. 
Therefore, climate-related events as defined in this article serve as exogenous events in our 
second-stage analysis.  
                                                 
7 Such expectations would have direct effects on conflict risk, independent of current economic conditions. 
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find it likely that climate-related disasters perform better as an instrument for economic 
growth in global panel studies than rainfall and temperature variation do. 
Obviously, consequences of sudden natural disasters differ across countries. This may be 
due to culture, infrastructure, political institutions, etc. Some of these aspects we can control 
for by including control variables in the analysis while others effect on results is reduced by 
the inclusion of country-fixed effects.  
DATA 
Our panel dataset covers the period 1980–2007 and includes 171 independent countries and 
4,455 country-year observations, although some are lost during analysis because of missing 
control variables (see summary statistics in Table I). We only include the data since 1980 
because older disaster data are less reliable (Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 
2004).  
Dependent variable 1: economic growth 
The dependent variable in our growth analysis (Hypothesis 1) is the real GDP per capita 
growth rate (in terms of purchasing power parity). Data come from Penn World Table 
Version 6.3 (Heston, Summers & Aten, 2009). As the summary statistics in Table I show, 
average annual real GDP per capita growth was 1.7% during the period 1980–2007. The data 
clearly have some extreme values, ranging from -65.1% in Iraq (1991) and -62.4% in Liberia 
(1990) to 123.3% in Equatorial Guinea (1997). The first two figures are related to conflicts—
the first Gulf War in Iraq and civil war in Liberia—and the latter to the discovery of large oil 
reserves in Equatorial Guinea in the mid-1990s. Despite some extreme values, the variable 
has approximately a normal distribution and 90% of observations are inside the -8.8% to 
10.1% range. 
 
Table I about here 
Dependent variable 2: armed civil conflict 
We use armed civil conflict onsets from the annually updated UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom & Wallensteen, 2010) as our dependent variable in 
the conflict analysis. The dataset has a relatively low inclusion criterion (25 annual battle-
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related deaths), which allows us to include low-intensity conflicts. We include all internal and 
internationalized internal conflicts in our dataset. We use a dummy variable with a value of 1 
when a new conflict emerges, when one of the parties in the conflict has changed completely, 
or when a conflict that has been inactive for more than two calendar years reemerges. In total, 
our dataset has 155 onsets, which comprise 3.5% of all country-year observations (Table I). 
As an alternative measure for a robustness check we include a dummy for conflict incidence 
with a value of 1 for all country-years with conflict. We also construct an onset dummy for 
conflicts which accumulate more than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the 
conflict. All data comes from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. 
As a country with an ongoing armed conflict can experience an outbreak of a new conflict, 
we include all country-year observations following the conflict onset. This allows us to 
include all conflict onsets in the dataset. To control for the possibility that a country that is 
already experiencing conflict, or that recently endured one, may be more likely to experience 
another conflict, we include a variable that counts the years since the last year of conflict, as 
suggested by Beck, Katz & Tucker (1998). This also controls for time dependence. 
Climate-related disasters 
In this study, we use disaster data from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), 
developed by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).8
EM-DAT includes both natural and man-made disasters. We focus on climate-related 
disasters and, because we are especially interested in the exogeneity associated with shock-
like natural events, we only include hazards sorting under the disaster classes floods and 
storms in EM-DAT.
 EM-DAT 
is a global dataset that has records on disasters since 1900. To qualify for inclusion in EM-
DAT, an event must meet at least one of the following criteria: 10 or more casualties, 100 or 
more people affected, declaration of a state of emergency, or call for international assistance. 
9
                                                 
8 EM-DAT is available publicly at www.emdat.be. 
 They typically have rapid onsets and disappear within one month. As 
long as these events occur as shocks (that is, they last less than one month), they are included 
9 Previous versions of this article also included wet mass movements. These account for only 9% of the 1758 
climatic disaster observations in our data. A robustness check revealed that they are not robustly related to 
climatic disasters and that they do not affect our results when excluded. Consequently, we only investigate 
floods and storms in this article. 
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in the analysis. An overview of all thirteen climate-related disasters included in our analysis is 
provided in Table II. 
 
Table II about here 
 
EM-DAT includes information on the numbers of people killed and people affected by the 
event, and the total direct damage (in current US dollars). We use the number of people 
affected as our main variable of interest. 
How a disaster affects national income in any given year is likely to depend on the relative 
magnitude of the disaster as well as the time elapsed since the event took place. We normalize 
all disasters in a similar fashion to Noy (2009) in order to take these two factors into account. 
To account for magnitude, we normalize the size of an event by dividing the size of the 
affected population by total country population, using lagged figures for total population to 
ensure that the effect of the event does not enter into the denominator. Population numbers are 
taken from United Nations Statistical Data (UNSD 2011). 
With regard to timing, because we measure economic growth on annual basis, we need to 
correct for event time; an event that happened in January potentially has a larger effect on the 
current year’s income than an event that happened toward the end of year, which is more 
likely to affect the following year’s growth figure. To address this concern, we weight the 
time elapsed since the event using the devaluation rate (12–event monthijt)/12 in which j is a 
natural disaster in country i in year t. In other words, if an event took place in January (event 
month is 1), the normalized affected population is multiplied by 11/12. If the event happened 
in July, the multiplier is 5/12. This time appreciation allows disasters occurring in January this 
year to have a larger impact on current economic growth than disasters occurring in 
December this year. If a country has experienced several events during one year, the 
individual values are aggregated. 
The annual, normalized, time-adjusted size of population affected over the year is thus 
calculated as: 
  (1) 
where population affectedijt is the number of people affected in country i by disaster j at year 
t, total populationit-1 is the previous year’s population size, and (12–event monthijt)/12 is the 
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imposed time weight. The left hand side of the equation thus represents the aggregated 
population affected over all climate-related disasters during year t. 
Table I reports the disaster variable as a percentage—on average less than 0.45% of the 
population is reported to need immediate assistance because of climate-related natural 
disasters for a given country-year observation. The variation, though, is considerable. 
Although 2,960 country-year observations report that no disasters took place, the largest 
disasters affected up to 62% of the population.10
Control variables: economic growth model 
 For any given event, on average 1.4% of the 
population is affected (not reported). Table I shows that the time-weighted population 
affected (as defined in Equation 1) is roughly half the size of the non-weighted figure. This 
confirms that disasters, on a global scale, are distributed equally over the year. The table also 
shows that floods and storms are very similar in terms of population affected. 
Controls that we include in the economic growth model follow the literature on natural 
disasters and economic growth, such as Noy (2009) and Raddatz (2009). All control variables 
are lagged by one year to minimize the occurrence of reversed causality.  
Our first control is lagged GDP per capita growth. Inclusion of lagged growth controls 
indirectly for omitted variables, at least to the extent that it embodies information on what was 
important in determining the dependent variable in the previous year (Andersen, 2002). In 
addition, a lagged growth variable allows us to estimate both the direct effect of the 
exogenous disaster shocks on current growth and their indirect effect on the following year’s 
growth via lagged growth. Indeed, to the extent that current economic growth is determined 
by growth last year, natural disasters occurring today can affect future economic growth. The 
other controls include measures for trade openness (absolute value of imports and exports 
relative to GDP), inflow and outflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a share of GDP, 
investment share of real GDP, the size of government expenditures relative to real GDP, and 
(logged) inflation using the consumer price index (CPI).11
                                                 
10 Moldova experienced a large-scale storm in November 2000 that affected roughly 2.6 million people (EM-
DAT, 2010). The second and third largest disasters (in terms of population affected relative to total 
population) in our data are the tropical cyclone that hit Solomon Islands in May 1986 and Hurricane 
Michelle, which hit Cuba in November 2001. They affected 55% and 53% of the population, respectively. 
 Data for trade openness, 
investment, and governments expenditures come from Penn World Table Version 6.3 
11 Inclusion of these variables as controls in growth models is discussed in detail in Barro & Sala-i-Martin (2004: 
518-540). 
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(Heston, Summers  & Aten, 2009). Data for foreign direct investments and inflation come 
from The World Bank (2010). 
Control variables: armed conflict model 
Previous quantitative work on armed conflict has identified several factors that affect the 
onset of conflict. To keep our regression models as simple and parsimonious as possible in the 
second stage, we have limited the selection of controls to population size and regime type. 
Several other factors have been tested as part of the sensitivity assessment, but these do not 
affect the main results. 
Population data come from Penn World Table Version 6.3. These data are both lagged and 
logged. We use a lagged Polity IV variable (Marshall & Jaggers, 2009) to measure level of 
democratization. It varies from 0 to 20, in which 0 denotes the most autocratic and 20 the 
most democratic state. Following Hegre et al. (2001), we include both the linear and squared 
measure in the model. The summary statistics for these variables are given in Table I. 
ANALYSIS 
Climatic disasters and economic growth 
To test our first hypothesis, we estimate regression models with different transformations of 
the relevant explanatory variable, population affected.12
  (2) 
 In the analysis we estimate the 
following two-way error component model: 
 where  
For each country i at year t we denote the following: yit is the per capita GDP growth rate; α1 
is the disaster coefficient for the sum of the population affected by all disasters j in that year 
                                                 
12 We also constructed similar measures for people killed and economic damage in which the number of people 
killed by the disaster are normalized by the size of total population and the amount of economic damage by 
GDP. Both measures use the same weight structure as people affected (Equation 1). Of these variables 
population affected was the best predictor of growth. It also renders the other two measures insignificant 
when all three variables are included in the base models simultaneously (the results are not shown).  
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(as defined in Equation 1); α2 is the coefficient for lagged economic growth yit-1;13
A valid critique of previous studies is that they ignore time-independent geographic factors 
such as climate and closeness to the coastline or the equator, which affects the occurrence of 
natural disasters and economic growth (Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger, 1999). Furthermore, 
while developed countries may experience less human and infrastructural damage when 
disasters strike them, developing countries may have a tendency to exaggerate the impact of 
disasters to attract more aid from abroad (Skidmore & Toya, 2002). To reduce biases caused 
by these concerns, we estimate country fixed effects models, i.e. with variables transformed to 
deviations from their country-specific means. This effectively removes time-independent 
growth-factors, contained in the vector ηi. We also include fixed year dummies to control for 
global shocks, the vector τt. Hence, both levels and trends in economic growth are picked up 
in a non-parametric fashion.
 κit-1 is a 
vector of control variables (we follow the short-run growth literature by lagging them one 
year); and uit is the error term composed of country-specific, unobserved factors independent 
of time, ηi, year-specific, unobserved factors independent of country-characteristics, τt, and an 
idiosyncratic error term εit. Iη and Iτ are two column vectors of ones. 
14
Table III reports the results on the effects of climate-related disasters on per capita 
economic growth. As an introductory estimation, Model 1 includes a simple dummy variable 
noting whether a large-scale disaster took place in the country. The model also includes 
lagged economic growth for the previous year and the other control variables: openness to 
foreign trade, investment, government expenditure, FDI, and inflation, all lagged by one year. 
The results show a negative effect on current economic growth, significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table III about here 
 
We next study the effect of our more sophisticated climatic disaster variable that also explores 
variation in the smaller disasters. Model 2 includes our main variable of interest, the time-
weighted population affected together with the controls from Model 1.15
                                                 
13 Other subsequent growth studies suggest that this AR(1) specification should be used (Raddatz, 2007; Noy,  
2009). 
 As can be seen from 
14 As robustness checks we also include country-specific time trends in the models in Table III. Use of these does 
not change the results (not shown).   
15 Including other controls such as current account balance, life expectancy at birth, etc. does not affect the 
results regarding our variable of interest. 
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the results, the effect of climatic natural disasters on current economic growth is negative and 
highly significant. When the weighted population affected increases by one standard deviation 
(0.014), economic growth is predicatively reduced by 0.38 percentage points (26.8*0.014) 
within the same year. The long-run growth reduction, calculated by evaluating Equation 2 in 
steady state with yit equal to yit-1, is predicatively 0.46 percentage points (0.38/(1–0.18)). 
In Model 3 we include floods and storms separately to compare their impact on growth. 
The coefficients are similar and highly significant, and a F-test rejects the hypothesis that the 
marginal effects are different (F-value is 0.31; p-value is 0.58). This result holds across all 
specifications in the article. Thus, we use the combined measure for floods and storms in 
subsequent models. 
We conduct several robustness checks of which some are reported in Table IV. Model 4 in 
Table IV shows that the results remain similar when all controls except for lagged growth are 
removed. As a control for other natural disasters, Model 5 shows the results using 
earthquakes, volcano eruptions, and droughts as additional regressors (earthquakes and 
volcanos are also measured by the number of people affected while drought is modeled by a 
dummy for the relevant country-years). Our climatic disaster variable proves robust to these 
controls and only drought seems to be significantly related to economic growth. Model 6 adds 
lagged population affected to the Model 2 from Table III. The lagged disaster variable has a 
positive sign, but fails to attain conventional significance level. It does not have any effect on 
our main variable of interest. Model 7 uses logged population affected and returns a strong 
negative impact on economic growth. Model 8 extends the time series to 1970 (the first year 
with available population data from UNSD), returning the same results as for the shorter time-
span. Model 9 reruns the model with population affected without time weights. As expected, 
we get a negative coefficient about half of the size compared to the time weighted population 
affected. 
 
Table IV about here 
 
So far we have used the fixed effects estimator to control for time- and country-independent 
growth factors. Country-years probably also differ with respect to fixed conflict risk factors, 
so we use this estimator in the section about civil conflicts as well. However, fixed effects 
regressions based on Equation 2 might yield biased results because yit-1 is correlated with the 
country-specific averaged error εi by construction. As a final robustness check we adress this 
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concern in Model 10 where the Arellano & Bond (1991) estimator is applied instead.16 The 
empirical results confirm our previous findings: an increase in population affected by one 
standard deviation now corresponds to a total growth reduction of 0.56 percentage points.17
In total, the work presented so far provides quantitative evidence of a negative causal 
effect on short-run economic growth from the number of people affected by climatic disasters. 
The respective coefficients are significant and the results are robust to different model 
specifications and control variables used in the economic literature. If anything, these results 
can be taken as support for the argument that climate-related disasters alter factors that are 
important for production and income, and hence reduce overall economic performance. 
   
Armed civil conflict 
The second goal of this study is to analyze how growth changes triggered by climatic 
disasters determine the risk of armed civil conflict onset. Previous studies have shown that 
low income levels and slow economic growth increase the risk of armed civil conflict onset. 
From this, it follows that climate-related disasters may increase the likelihood of conflict 
through their negative impact on income growth. Analytically, we can define civil conflicts as 
a function of economic growth, and economic growth as a function of climatic disasters. 
According to advocated postulations and the chain rule, the dynamics are then given by: 
  (3) 
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation 3 can be understood as a structural equation 
describing the growth effects on conflicts. It is empirically specified as: 
  (4) 
For each country i at time t we denote the following: cit is a dummy variable equal to one for 
all observations with new armed civil conflict onset; β1IV is the coefficient for the 
                                                 
16 The estimator builds on a GMM-framework. It is obtained by differencing Equation 2 once, using all past 
values of economic growth in levels as instruments for present values in first-differences (this generates 71 
instruments). Country-specific effects are eliminated by the differentiation, and the instruments remove 
correlation between lagged growth and error terms. 
17 Arellano-Bond tests (in first differences) suggest that the error term follows an AR(1) process (p-value is 
0.000), but not an AR(2) (p-value is 0.337). The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions does not reject the 
null (p-value is 0.275). All these numbers provide support for our model specification. The system GMM-
estimator initially developed by Arellano & Bover (1995) gives similar results (not shown). 
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instrumented income growth ŷit;18 γ is the coefficient vector for a vector of lagged control 
variables δit-1; and vit is the error term.19
Table V summarizes key results from our instrumental variable analysis. First, we check 
how robust the disaster-growth relation is to commonly used conflict determinants. Model 11 
includes controls for population size, regime type, and length of peace prior to the onset. The 
key explanatory variable as defined in Equation 1 is unchanged. The results confirm that our 
measure for climatic disasters is robust. The estimated growth reduction is 0.18 percentage 
points per percentage point increase in the disaster variable. The computed F-value is 11.48 
(p-value < 0.001). In other words, climatic disasters seem to be strongly relevant for short-
term growth fluctuations in GDP per capita, even when controlling for typical conflict 
variables.  
 Because the dependent variable is binary, the model 
in the second stage is a linear probability model. The parameter of interest in the structural 
equation is β1IV. 
 
Table V about here 
 
As well as being relevant for income growth in the first-stage equation, climatic events should 
be exogenous in the second stage. A potential problem is that climate-related disasters might 
affect the risk of conflict through channels other than income. If this is true, we could get 
biased coefficients in the second-stage regression. Theoretically, weather-related disasters 
may affect conflict propensity in ways other than through income growth. For instance, if 
such events destroy communication and transportation systems, they may affect the mobility 
of the military and potential rebel groups. Net consequences of these mobility constraints are 
in theory ambiguous. On the one hand, climate-related disasters might separate conflict 
parties from each other, and thereby temporarily postpone an onset. On the other hand, if 
government forces depend more heavily on roads and conventional communication systems, 
climatic disasters might shift the conditions to wage war asymmetrically and thereby increase 
conflict risk as potential rebels’ opportunity to emerge and survive may increase. 
Thus, it is not feasible to rule out the possibility that sudden climatic disasters determine 
the probability of new conflicts only through income, a requirement for the instrument to be 
valid. Nevertheless, a reduced-form specification can at least provide some hints about the 
general relation between climate-related events and armed civil conflict. Model 12 in Table V 
                                                 
18 The hat above y indicates that we use the instrumented rather than the observed values. 
19 Again we estimate country and time fixed effects models. 
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reports results from a reduced-form equation, i.e. the (short-run) effect from climate-related 
disasters on conflict onset. Current economic growth is also included in order to illustrate the 
typical negative growth effect found in previous studies.20
The other results presented by Model 12 are similar to the results in a number of previous 
studies. Economic growth is negatively linked to the risk of conflict onset: when economic 
growth increases by one percentage point, the risk of armed civil conflict onset is 
predicatively reduced by 0.11 percentage points. This result is significant at the 5% level. 
While all control variables have their expected signs, none of them are significant at the 10% 
level. In total, we find no support in our data that climatic disasters affect conflict onset other 
than through income fluctuations.  
 As the model shows, climate-
related disasters have no significant direct effect on the risk of conflict onset in our data. In 
fact, the average relation between population affected and conflict onset is negative (point 
estimate equal to -0.083), i.e. the opposite of our a priori hypothesis. 
Model 13 shows results from the 2SLS analysis (Model 11 provides the first-stage results). 
Here, the link between current growth and conflict onset has changed from being negative and 
significant to being (positive and) clearly insignificant. In other words, growth changes 
caused by climatic disasters do not seem to affect the likelihood of experiencing a conflict 
onset. This is a further indication that changes in economic growth triggered by climatic 
disasters do not affect the probability of conflict onset. 
To test sensitivity of the results, we run several alternative specifications. Table VI reports 
some of these: Model 15 repeats the baseline specification (Model 13 in Table V) with 
country-specific time-trends in addition (Model 14 shows results from the first stage). While 
the instrument gain in strength (F-value is 17.7), the second stage results remain unchanged. 
In Models 16 and 17 we use the two disaster classes floods and storms as separate 
instruments.21
                                                 
20 We also estimated conflict models with one and two year time lags for economic growth, but these did not 
affect the conflict propensity.  
 As expected, the results are almost identical to Models 14 and 15 although the 
statistics suggest weaker identification in the first stage. The same is the case with Models 18 
and 19 that use the natural logarithm of population affected as instrument. Model 21 
substitutes the onset variable with a dummy for conflict incidence to test whether disaster-
triggered growth shocks affect the likelihood of conflict presence (reduced form is provided 
21 We cannot reject the null-hypothesis that both instruments are valid (Hansen J statistic equal to 0.182; p-value 
is 0.67). Country-specific time trends are included here as well to gain power in the first stage. 
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in Model 20; the first stage is the same as Model 11 in Table V). Models 22 and 23 examine 
onset of war (conflict onset that accumulated at least 1000 battle-related deaths during the 
course of conflict). As earlier, the second-stage results are insignificant. Taken together, the a 
priori expected negative effect from current economic growth on the risk of armed civil 
conflict onset is not present in our 2SLS models.22
These results differ from those in the empirical studies of Collier & Hoeffler (2004) and 
Miguel et al. (2004), who find significant negative effects from economic growth on the risk 
of civil conflict onset. Our results support the view that economic growth, when instrumented 
by climatic phenomena, does not relate systematically to armed civil conflict onset (Bernauer 
et al. 2012). This finding, however, may be specific to climate-related natural disasters and 
does not necessary rule out growth impacts on conflict in general. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Climate change may well be the most serious and wide-ranging future challenge facing our 
planet. Not only will it change the living conditions for people and animal and plant life on a 
permanent basis when it comes to temperature and precipitation, it may also increase the 
number or intensity of various climate-related disasters. To explore how these latter changes 
may play out for countries affected by such disasters, this article examines how climate-
related disasters affect economic growth and armed civil conflicts during the period 1980–
2007.23
Our results show that an increase by one standard deviation in the number of people 
affected by sudden climatic disasters leads to a total aggregate income growth reduction of 
about 0.5 percentage points. Arguably, storms and floods adversely affect people and 
production inputs such as land, infrastructure, and factories, which in turn have a negative 
impact on the aggregate economy. 
 
Interestingly, these negative income shocks do not increase the risk of armed civil conflict 
as predicted by prominent studies in the field (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 
2003; Miguel et al., 2004). However, our results primarily justify assertions about income 
                                                 
22 As further robustness checks, we run several alternative specifications of the base model: generalized least 
squares models without country fixed effects, logit models, expand the time period to 1970–2007, and add 
other controls. None of these change the results. 
23 For an attempt to predict the future, see Devitt and Tol (2012) who simulate a model with climate change, civil 
war and development. 
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changes caused by climatic disasters. It might still be the case that growth shocks caused by 
rainfall (see Miguel et al., 2004) change the likelihood of civil conflicts in ways other than 
growth shocks caused by sudden floods and storms, although analyses conducted on a more 
local scale indicate that short-term variations in climate do not seem to provoke land-related 
conflicts (Benjaminsen et al., 2012) and that drought periods see fewer episodes of violent 
cattle raiding (Roba et al., 2012). 
There could be several possible reasons why we find, based on historical data, that 
economic downturn caused by climatic hazards does not seem to come with increased conflict 
risk on a year-by-year basis. First, it may matter what has caused economic hardship in the 
country. A natural disaster may be viewed by the population as outside the government’s 
control and thus the economic consequences are not blamed on the government. Second, 
people hit by such a disaster may consider economic consequences as transitory; after the 
houses have been rebuild and next harvest is in, the life is expected to return back to normal 
in economic terms. Third, as disasters can have unifying effects on the population that diverts 
attention from other grievances, they might, at least transitionally, reduce the likelihood that a 
rebel movement emerges (Slettebak, 2012).   
Finally, our results may indicate that economic growth and income level may not be such 
important sources of conflict as previous studies imply. We find our results appealing because 
the traditional economic approach with rebels as rational utility-maximizing individuals does 
not necessarily yield a negative income-conflict relationship. Indeed, higher income growth 
could make it more attractive to take up arms as long as higher national income means that 
there is more to grab. In other words, the argument that higher growth represents higher 
alternative costs associated with rebellion is not as straightforward as generally thought, even 
if one accepts the rather restrictive definition of rebels as rational and utility-maximizing 
individuals. This is in line with economic theory that suggests a positive relationship between 
economic growth and crime rates (Mehlum, Moene & Torvik, 2004).  
Hence, our insignificant 2SLS estimates might be an indication that the linkage between 
economic conditions and conflict risk is far more complex or heterogeneous than suggested 
by earlier country-year analyses. When it comes to climate change and increased frequency 
and severity of climate disasters, our study indicates that in the past, the short-term negative 
effect of climate-induced disasters on economic growth does not increase the risk of conflict 
onset in the following two year period. Thus, there is a need for studies that look at the long-
term economic effects of disasters and how these relate to the risk of armed civil conflict.   
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Replication data 
The dataset and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at 
http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. All analyses was done using Stata 11. 
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Table I. Descriptive statistics for data used in the analysis 
Variable # Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
     
Conflict onset (>  25 battle deaths) 4,455 0.035 0.183 0 1 
Real GDP per capita growth (%) 4,354 1.726 7.415 -65.1 123.3 
Climatic disasters 
     
Large disaster (> 10,000 affected) 4,417 0.171 0.376 0 1 
Population affected (%) 4,279 0.448 2.689 0 62.5 
Population affected (%), time weights 4,279 0.201 1.388 0 32.2 
Affected by floods (%), time weights 4,279 0.110 0.946 0 23.5 
Affected by storms (%), time weights 4,279 0.090 1.012 0 32.2 
Control variables (all lagged by one year) 
    
Openness of economy (%) 4,356 77.4 49.1 1.086 456.6 
Real investment share of GDP (%) 4,342 20.1 11.8 -18.9 90.3 
Real government share of GDP (%) 4,342 19.0 10.0 1.438 83.3 
FDI inflow relative to GDP (%) 3,876 3.608 19.7 -82.9 564.9 
FDI outflow relative to GDP (%) 3,468 1.129 14.2 -10.4 570.4 
Inflation  3,630 46.0 505.3 -100.0 23,773.1 
Population size (’000) 4,369 33,444 120,500 149.8 1,313,974 
Democracy index  4,065 11.2 7.33 0 20 
FDI=Foreign direct investment 
 
Table II. Climate-related disasters included in the study 
Disaster class Disaster type 
Floods 
General floods 
River floods 
Flash floods 
Coastal floods 
Storm surge 
Storms 
Tropical storms 
Extra-tropical cyclones 
Thunderstorms/lightning 
Snowstorms/blizzards 
Sandstorms/dust storms 
Generic (severe) storms 
Tornadoes 
Orographic storms (strong winds) 
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Table III. Climate-related disasters and economic growth, 1980–2007 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 GDP/capita 
growth 
GDP/capita 
growth 
GDP/capita 
growth 
    
Population affected (time weights), t  -26.8***  
  (-6.75)  
Affected by floods (time weights), t   -31.0*** 
   (-3.10) 
Affected by storms (time weights), t   -24.0*** 
   (-4.47) 
Climatic disaster (dummy), t -0.53*   
 (-1.91)   
GDP/capita growth, t-1 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
 (3.89) (3.94) (3.93) 
Trade openness, t-1 0.015** 0.014* 0.014* 
 (2.00) (1.92) (1.92) 
Real investment share of GDP, t-1 0.031 0.031 0.031 
 (0.75) (0.76) (0.76) 
Real government share of GDP, t-1 0.025 0.025 0.025 
 (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) 
FDI inflow, t-1 0.36* 0.36* 0.36* 
 (1.90) (1.92) (1.92) 
FDI outflow, t-1 -0.30** -0.30** -0.30** 
 (-1.98) (-1.99) (-1.99) 
Inflation (ln), t-1 -0.075 -0.069 -0.068 
 (-0.72) (-0.66) (-0.65) 
    
Observations 2,940 2,904 2,904 
Countries 149 145 145 
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Robust t-statistics, clustered on countries, in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Fixed country and year effects are included in all analyses. Models are estimated with STATA 11.
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Table IV. Climate-related disasters and economic growth – Robustness tests 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 GDP/capita 
growth 
GDP/capita 
growth 
GDP/capita 
growth 
GDP/capita 
growth 
GDP/capita 
growth 
GDP/capita 
growth 
GDP/capita 
growth 
        
Population affected  (time weights), t -22.6*** -26.5*** -26.6***  -25.7***  -32.8*** 
 (-4.27) (-6.65) (-6.71)  (-6.56)  (-5.12) 
Population affected  (time weights), t-1   4.72     
   (0.91)     
Population affected (ln)  (time weights), t    -0.55***    
    (-4.14)    
Population affected  (no time weights), t      -12.4**  
      (-2.28)  
Earthquakes (time weights), t  -3.11      
  (-0.31)      
Volcanoes (time weights), t  -25.0      
  (-0.10)      
Droughts (dummy), t  -0.62*      
  (-1.94)      
GDP/capita growth, t-1 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 
 (2.79) (3.93) (3.96) (3.92) (4.28) (3.91) (3.47) 
Trade openness, t-1  0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 0.013* 0.014* 0.034 
  (1.91) (1.93) (1.88) (1.67) (1.91) (1.26) 
Real investment share of GDP, t-1  0.031 0.031 0.032 0.023 0.032 -0.042 
  (0.76) (0.76) (0.78) (0.60) (0.77) (-0.46) 
Real government share of GDP, t-1  0.024 0.025 0.025 0.015 0.023 0.052 
  (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.20) (0.26) (0.26) 
FDI inflow, t-1  0.36* 0.36* 0.36* 0.34* 0.36* 0.053 
  (1.92) (1.91) (1.92) (1.82) (1.91) (0.61) 
FDI outflow, t-1  -0.30** -0.30** -0.30** -0.29* -0.30** -0.050 
  (-1.99) (-1.99) (-1.99) (-1.88) (-1.99) (-0.68) 
Inflation (ln), t-1  -0.071 -0.072 -0.055 -0.041 -0.069 0.15 
  (-0.68) (-0.68) (-0.52) (-0.40) (-0.65) (0.77) 
        
Observations 4,210 2,904 2,904 2,904 3,256 2,904 2,731 
Countries 162 145 145 145 145 145 143 
R-squared 0.07 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 – 
Time period 1980–2007 1980–2007 1980–2007 1980–2007 1970–2007 1980–2007 1980–2007 
Robust t-statistics, clustered on countries, in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Fixed country and year effects are included 
in all analyses. Models are estimated with STATA 11.
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Table V. Climatic disasters, economic growth, and armed civil conflict, 1980–2007 
 (11) (12) (13) 
 GDP/capita growth Conflict onset Conflict onset 
    
GDP/capita growth, t  -0.0011** 0.0035 
  (-2.01) (0.65) 
Population affected (time weights), t -18.02*** -0.083 Instrument 
 (-3.39) (-0.84)  
Population (ln), t-1 -2.02 0.053 0.062* 
 (-0.98) (1.65) (1.74) 
Democracy index, t-1 0.055 0.0052 0.0049 
 (0.32) (1.14) (1.04) 
Democracy index (squared), t-1 -0.0020 -0.00020 -0.00019 
 (-0.25) (-0.94) (-0.87) 
    
Observations 3,894 3,894 3,894 
Countries 153 153 153 
R-squared 0.05 0.03 – 
F-test of instrument – – 11.48*** 
Robust z-statistics (t-statistics in first stage columns), clustered on countries, in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, 
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Fixed country and year effects are included in all analyses. Coefficients for time 
since last onset and cubic splines are not shown. Models are estimated with STATA 11.
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Table VI. Armed civil conflict – Robustness tests 
 (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
 GDP/capita 
growth 
Conflict 
onset 
GDP/capita 
growth 
Conflict 
onset 
GDP/capita 
growth 
Conflict 
onset 
Conflict 
incidence 
Conflict 
incidence War onset War onset 
           
GDP/capita growth, t  0.0045  0.0045  0.0020 -0.0020*** -0.012 -0.00025 -0.0020 
  (0.96)  (0.96)  (0.29) (-2.67) (-1.28) (-1.55) (-0.90) 
Population affected  (time 
weights), t 
-20.1*** Instrument     0.18 Instrument 0.031 Instrument 
(-4.20)      (1.10)  (0.82)  
Affected by floods (time 
weights), t 
  -20.4** Instrument       
  (-2.21)        
Affected by storms (time 
weights), t 
  -19.7*** Instrument       
  (-4.40)        
Population affected (ln)  (time 
weights), t 
    -0.38*** Instrument     
    (-2.70)      
Population (ln), t-1 -14.9** 0.065 -14.9** 0.065 -2.04 0.059* 0.045 0.025 0.0032 -0.00025 
 (-2.05) (0.43) (-2.05) (0.43) (-0.99) (1.66) (0.75) (0.35) (0.46) (-0.03) 
Democracy index, t-1 -0.24 -0.0054 -0.24 -0.0054 0.059 0.0050 0.010 0.011 0.0029** 0.0030** 
 (-1.02) (-0.93) (-1.02) (-0.93) (0.35) (1.07) (1.22) (1.30) (2.04) (2.14) 
Democracy index (squared), t-1 0.012 0.00031 0.012 0.00031 -0.0023 -0.00019 -0.00056 -0.00058 -0.00013** -0.00013** 
 (1.07) (1.18) (1.07) (1.17) (-0.28) (-0.89) (-1.42) (-1.47) (-2.06) (-2.13) 
           
Observations 3,894 3,894 3,894 3,384 3,894 3,894 3,894 3,894 3,894 3,894 
Countries 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
R-squared 0.13 – 0.13 – 0.05 – 0.27 – 0.01 – 
F-test of instrument – 17.65*** – 13.87*** – 7.31*** – 11.48*** – 11.48*** 
Country-specific year trend Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Robust z-statistics (t-statistics in first stage columns), clustered on countries, in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Fixed country and year effects are 
included in all analyses. Coefficients for time since last onset and cubic splines are not shown. Models are estimated with STATA 11. 
